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The State as Banker and Entrepreneur
The Last-Resort Character of the Mexican State's

Economic Intervention, 1917-76

Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe*

There is a growing body of evidence to demonstrate that the Mexican state that

was consolidated in the wake of the Mexican Revolution deliberately created
and has continued to nurture a national bourgeoisie which has been a major
force in the spectacular economic growth (the "Mexican miracle") of the past
four decades, growth that has had little or no benefit for-indeed some argue
was built on the backs of-the Mexican lower classes.' And yet, paradoxically,
the capitalists that have so benefited rarely view the activities of the Mexican
state with more than suspicion, and often portray it as their principal enemy--or
perhaps not so surprisingly. Hardly limiting itself to mere infrastructure investments or the provision of investment incentives, the Mexican state has itself

emerged as the major banker and entrepreneur in the economy. Its own
enterprises have preempted private-sector savings to finance public investment;
they have closed off opportunities for private investment; and they enjoy special

advantages in sectors where public and private forms compete. Even in comparison with other major Latin American countries, the Mexican state has been

atypically and forcefully interventionist in its national economy, particularly
with regard to the scope of its involvement in the manufacturing sector.2
These two seemingly opposed views of the Mexican state are both factually
accurate and reconcilable under the following thesis: Following on the Revolution, the Mexican state came to take on the role of making capitalism work for

Mexico, and, in the context of Mexico's being a dependent, late-starting
industrializer, this task required, for any degree of success, both major restrictions on the demands of the lower classes and the forceful entry of the state into
areas of the economy where the private sector was unwilling or unable to enter,

or had entered and failed. The central question of this article addresses part of
this thesis: Why has the state emerged as the major banker and entrepreneur in

Mexico's economy?3
0010-4159/8010115-0003$05.00/1
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Gerschenkron: The State and Requisites of Late Industrialization
Alexander Gerschenkron's historical researches provide the most insightful
starting point for an explanation of state involvement in an industrializing
economy. Diverging from the thesis that developing countries travel the same
road towards industrialization as more developed ones, only trailing them by
some decades, Gerschenkron argues that the industrialization process in the
more backward countries requires (among other things) "the application of
institutional instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an

established, industrial country."4 Thus, where capital formation was accomplished in Great Britain through the exertions of individual capitalists, later

industrializers (such as France and Germany) required investment banks for the
same purpose, and those embarking still later (such as Russia) needed the still
more powerful institutional means of the state itself-its taxation powers-to

generate the needed investment capital.
Gerschenkron focused his attention on industrialization in Europe, but, in the
dependent context of Latin American countries such as Mexico, Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, the dynamics of late, late industrialization have been some-

what different. In these countries, industrialization initially focused not on
producer goods, but rather on formerly imported consumer goods through a
process of import-substitution originally forced on these countries by depressions and wars in the developed capitalist world.5 Even more than for the late
industrializers of Europe, this late, late industrialization has set certain problems for these Latin American countries which their private sectors have been
unable or unwilling to meet and solve. The problems are greater in scope and
character for a number of reasons. Products and processes are more sophisticated, and the necessary technology not only expensive (if the owners--often
transnational corporations-are willing to sell), but also almost impossible to
develop domestically with available talent. The problem of being competitive
with production methods utilized elsewhere in the world is not simply a concern
for export production, but also for the domestic market because of the penetration of these countries by capital from the more industrialized countries. Labor
in these late, late industrializers is often better organized to make good its
demands for a sizable share of the profits than was the case with the first
industrializers. These problems (and of course there were others) were exacerbated in Mexico by the devastation of the Revolution, which extended through
much of the second decade of this century. Mexico emerged from the Revolution without an entrepreneurial class capable of leading industrialization; consequently, a need arose for special institutional arrangements to confront and
solve the problems of late, late industrialization. As Gerschenkron found in
Europe, we find in Mexico (and to a certain extent in other Latin American
countries) that state institutions have come to meet these problems. Our basic
166
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contention regarding the role of the state in the political economy of Mexico
(although only limited evidence can be provided in this article) can be stated as
follows: (1) The Mexican state has taken on the task of making capitalism work
for Mexico; by (2) placing primary reliance on the private sector, promoting
and strengthening it to lead the way in rapid economic growth; but (3) the state
has stood ready to intervene in the economy as an institution of last resort,
though sometimes an impatient one, acting as banker and as entrepreneur to
deal with those problems that the private sector has been unwilling or unable to

handle, or has tried to handle but failed.6
Gerschenkron's argument about the role of the state in industrialization in
situations of relative backwardness can thus be extended to cover the case of

Mexico-and will prove revealing. But, before proceeding, we should briefly

take note of an incompleteness that his account has when considered as
description, and an even more serious flaw that it has when considered as
explanation.
His account is limited as a description because its central terms must be filled
in historically. The conceptions of "problem," "last resort," and "inability"
(or "unwillingness") have objective and subjective moments. The trajectory of
growth-the mode of production in its fullest sense-throws up specific difficulties at particular points in time. But the manner in which these difficulties

are defined as problems, the way in which the state's responsibility for solving
them comes to be conceived, the recognition of the unwillingness or inability of

private-sector actors, the judgment that no other solution can be found except
by resort (last resort) to the instrumentality of the state-all these must be
understood in light of the conceptualizing orientations of state institutions and
leaders. And these orientations, in turn, change as problems are defined and

confronted, as learning takes place, as generations and administrations change.

How Gerschenkron's account is flawed as an explanation may be noted
simply by recognizing its functionalist or teleological character. Adducing that
the inability of private-sector actors to solve the problems of late, late industrialization creates "needs" for action by the state does not explain why (still less
how) the state acts to fulfill these needs. Such a functionalist explanation fails to
account for the will (or lack of will) of the state to undertake to meet these needs

and also fails to account for the state'spower successfully (or unsuccessfully) to
cope with these needs.

This article seeks to extend and develop Gerschenkron's suggestive approach. Looking historically at the Mexican case, we will endeavor to explain
how the conceptions of "problem" and "last resort" have come to take on the
meaning they have, and how the state created the power necessary to intervene
directly in the economy. We will focus particular attention on the problem of
the will or "orientations" of the state. Departing from interest-group theories
or Marxist/instrumentalist theories that see state action as a result of groups or
167
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classes acting on the state from the outside, we will argue that the state does
have certain "interests" or orientations of its own. But instead of simply
assuming, a priori, the existence of these orientations, as Marxist/structuralist

(or bureaucratic politics) approaches tend to, we will explore how the state
comes to take on the orientations it does. We will argue that the Mexican state's

orientations are historically filled in or taken on in three principal ways:
1. Following the Revolution, the Mexican state was reconstituted by a group of
Sonoran constitutionalists (commercial farmers and petty capitalists). Though more
nationalist than the preceding Porfirian regime, they once again set the country firmly

on a capitalist road to development. Taking the United States as a model, they placed

principal reliance on the still-frail private sector, but positioned the state to take
forceful action in last resort in instances of private-sector incapability or unwilling-

ness. This orientation was institutionalized in the Finance Ministry, the Bank of
Mexico, and other public-sector banks in significant measure through an increasingly

formalized training program.
2. Within this framing orientation, and within the ideological and political strictures of
the Revolutionary heritage, difficulties posed by domestic and international condi-

tions were diagnosed as problems, solutions were defined, and state interventions
were carried through. Thus, (among many other interventions) the Mexican state
built steel mills, paper and cement plants, and a railway construction firm; and it
bailed out and took over bankrupt private ventures in automobiles, banking, sugar,
etc. Once the state extended itself in this fashion, constituting or acquiring new
agencies or enterprises, new orientations were filled in or taken on by the state; and
because of their institutionalization, these new orientations became relatively stable,
setting the state on a certain trajectory, susceptible more to marginal alterations than

to wholesale change, even at the sexennial break.
3. Finally, changes of personnel (especially at the end of each presidential sexenio),
while less imporant than these other modes, have altered the orientations of the
Mexican state, in some instances (Cirdenas, L6pez Mateos, Echeverria) more than
others.

We will enlarge and substantiate this general argument principally through a
discussion of a few of the more paradigmatic instances of state intervention.' In

a conclusion, we will seek to clarify the conception of the state that is being

developed here, and we will address some issues concerning the changing
relations of public and private sectors in Mexico.

Reconstituting the State, 1917-40
The political stability that was the masterful achievement of Porfirio Diaz made

possible Mexico's first period of substantial and sustained economic growth
during the years of his tutelage. Railroads were constructed, mining was

168
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modernized and expanded, commercial agriculture was developed, and exports
were diversified.

A number of characteristics of that growth-particularly the foreign domination of certain leading sectors and the unequal distribution of the benefits of
economic growth-served as the tinder that ignited into the Revolution. Di-

verse factions of landless peasants, workers, small landholders, and disgruntled
politicians joined to topple Diaz in 1911 and then separated to contest the
settlement.

In the aftermath of the fighting, those who finally prevailed and undertook
the task of reconstituting the Mexican state were neither the agrarian radicals,
who saw the Revolution as a social movement to bring massive land reform, nor
those drawn from the more advanced factions of the labor and intellectual

groups which nurtured socialist and anarcho-syndicalist ideas. Instead, they
were predominantly of the middle class, many from the north-from Sonora

particularly-some, like Carranza and Obreg6n, from landowning families
(though not the largest of these), a few, like Calles, small businessmen.8 Two
questions need concern us, the question of power and the question of intention
or orientation. It is the latter of these-why the state chose to intervene in the

economy for the purposes and in the manner that it did-that principally
concerns us here, but we need to consider briefly the question of power because

the successful intervention of the state into the economy presupposed a strong
and unified governmental apparatus.
The power of the Mexican state to intervene directly into the economy grew
out of the strong political institutions that were created on top of the fragmented

class structure of postrevolutionary Mexico. In the dozen or so years following
the Constitutional Convention of 1917, Presidents Carranza, Obreg6n, and
Calles used their military power to crush armed opposition, built a strong
bureaucracy relying heavily on ticnicos (economists and engineers) in the key
ministries of Treasury and Public Works, and were able to co-opt and control
many dissident elements, an effort which culminated in the skillful construction

of the National Revolutionary party (PNR) (predecessor to the Institutional
Revolutionary party [PRI]). This increasingly strong central party institutionalized and monopolized access to political power, first by absorbing (or

destroying) local caudillos and then by containing lower-class pressures
through its labor and peasant sectors.'
These steps were made possible by the nonexistence of any social classes
sufficiently powerful and well-organized to oppose them. The hacendados had
been severely weakened by the Revolution. Peasant groups were debilitated by
their regional organization, limited local goals, and the cooptation or assassi-

nation of their leaders. Labor, weak because of repression under the Diaz
regime, remained crippled by control of the CROM, a corrupt labor confedera-
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tion highly dependent on governmental recognition for its right to strike.
Finally, no national industrial or financial bourgeoisie had emerged during the
foreign-dominated industrial growth of the Porfiriato (the Monterrey industri-

alists being a major exception), and those business interests that survived the
Revolution found themselves either aided by government actions or too small
and regionally isolated to oppose effectively the economic activities of the
state.

The northern origins of the "Sonora gang" that dominated Mexican politics
until Cairdenas assumed the presidency in 1934 are important for understanding
the framing orientations with which they infused the Mexican state. Because of

the proximity to the United States, nowhere was the domination of foreign
capital stronger than in the north. "By 1902 U.S. firms held more than a million

hectares in Sonora; in Sinaloa they owned 50% of the productive deltaic plain
and 75% of all irrigable land, where sugar, cotton, and fresh vegetables were
raised for the market," '10 often the U.S. market. And foreign (mostly American) domination of mining and manufacturing, often abetted by the protection
of Diaz and the cientificos, closed Mexicans out of other potentially productive
endeavors. That foreign domination wove a strongly nationalist thread through
their thinking,"11 an orientation that took on concrete form in Article 27 of the

constitution, and later in measures prohibiting foreigners from owning land,
forbidding their participation in banking and insurance companies, nationalizing the petroleum, light and power industries, and limiting or excluding their
equity participation in a growing number of manufacturing sectors.12
If the proximity to the United States had allowed a foreign domination which
rankled, it also put before the eyes of these Sonorans the image of a modem,
rapidly developing country. Beyond political consolidation, their primary

concern was with economic growth, and the model to be copied was the
capitalist system to the north with its dramatic successes in industrialization and

in large-scale commercial argiculture. It is important to remember that no
noncapitalist model existed to be copied-Russia's path was still uncertain-but it is more important that the Sonoran constitutionalists had no inclinations to

socialism (and that no other social class forces pushed strongly in that direction). Still, the decision to reintegrate Mexico into the world capitalist economy

left open a choice of routes. If the United States was to be the model for
development, that was much more so in the sense of showing the shape and
extent of what could be achieved than in the sense of showing a precise route to

be followed. Among the alternatives available were a minimalist, laissez-faire
state that would leave the speed and direction of growth to the private sector,
and the Porfirian model of growth through active encouragement of foreign
capital. The latter had just been rejected, however, and the former presumed the

existence of the sort of national bourgeoisie that had led development in the
United States and which was still nascent in Mexico: a "yeoman" agricultural
170
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class to promote agricultural modernization and an entrepreneurial class to lead
industrialization. Mexico' s peculiar conditions and its later start would require,
it was recognized, a forceful role for the state. The orientation chosen would
place primary reliance on the private sector, this private sector would be given
inducements and assistance, particularly to follow certain directions marked
out by the state as critical for development, but the state would stand ready to
take on those tasks that the private sector was unable or unwilling to do.
In the early 1920s, these orientations came to be firmly embedded in the

Ministry of Finance (Hacienda), and this ministry rapidly became the most
powerful in the state apparatus (a position that has only recently been challenged). Indeed, the Mexican state during this early postrevolutionary period
was, effectively, the president, the Finance Ministry, and the financial institutions around it (the Bank of Mexico, Nacional Financiera, etc.). The power of
these financial institutions inside the state apparatus stemmed in part from
Mexico's decision to abide by the rules of the world capitalist political economy: they were the institutions charged with stabilizing the currency, re-

negotiating debts, guaranteeing foreign loans, taxation, and control over
budgetary allocation of these funds. Although such actions required presidential consultation and approval, these financial institutions have been nearly
(again, until recently) the sole source of well-trained economists in Mexico.

In-house training programs molded the orientations of those who passed
through them to accord with the Treasury's view of matters.
The orientation of the Finance Ministry has changed over time, of course,
partly in response to regime changes in Mexico, partly in response to shifting
currents of economic thought outside Mexico. The concerns of Albert Pani and
the economists around him who shaped the character of the Finance Ministry in

the 1920s have been characterized as "orthodox" and neoclassical in orienta-

tion:
They sought to re-establish the nation's foreign trade position, restore confidence

in the monetary system, and get channels of domestic trade and commerce
operating once more.l3

When Cardenas came to power, those who staffed the key positions in the
Finance Ministry and in the Bank of Mexico came to be more oriented towards

Keynesian principles: growth in gross national product (GNP), aggregate
investment, and employment became major economic indicators.
Beneath these changes in orientation ran a deep continuity, however. The
Revolution had brought to the surface a series of radical demands or goals: for
land redistribution, for recovery of national patrimony from foreigners, for
substantial improvement in the terms of life for urban and rural lower classes.
These radical goals did not coalesce into a coherent ideology, still less into a
171
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strategy for development. While these goals continued to be articulated by the
revolutionary family, the strategy of economic development that came to be
adopted, its guiding intelligence in the Finance Ministry, was one that saw these
goals being pursued only insofar as they could be by-products of a certain kind
of economic growth in which primary reliance would be placed on the private
sector.

The common outlook among the middle- and high-level tecnicos in th

institutional complex demarcated by the Finance Ministry, the Bank of Mexic

and Nacional Financiera can be traced, to a large extent, to an in-house trainin
program developed in the Bank of Mexico by Gonzalo Robles and Daniel Cosio
Villegas and administered for a number of years by Robles. As a young man h
had been a member of Carranza's retinue; he had studied engineering in th
United States; and he had been centrally involved in the reorganization of th
banking system. For a time, under Cardenas, he was director general of th
Bank of Mexico, moving later to become director of a new office in the bank

the department of industrial studies, from which he coordinated the trainin
program. Promising young people were brought into the bank for a few years

sent off to foreign countries (often the United States) for graduate study, then

returned for final shaping under Robles's careful attention. The orientation they

received was the one we have already discussed: economic independence from
the colossus to the north, industrialization, the importance of a middle class
primary reliance on the private sector, and the need for vigorous action by th
state to create the conditions for private-sector investment and to do what th
private sector would not or could not."4

Placing such primary reliance on the private sector ran into immediate
difficulties. The national bourgeoisie was small and weak, and often disinclined to make long-term capital investments, preferring instead real estat
speculation, commercial credit, jewelry, and the like. The only alternative,

particularly if foreign investment was not to be encouraged, was state activity t

foster the growth of a national bourgeoisie and to promote the kinds o

conditions under which it would be inclined to invest. Major infrastructur
investments in road building and in irrigation began in the mid-1920s. But
nowhere was the early orientation of the state to be seen so clearly as in it
actions to create a strong financial sector, and the consequences of its action
here defined the terms of much of what would happen later.
Mexico faced nearly total financial collapse following the Revolution. Paper
currency was worthless, most of the private banks were in ruins, and the
country's standing in international financial circles had fallen so low that
further credits were unobtainable. Calles and his finance minister saw the

reorganization and resuscitation of a private banking system as a critical first
step to generating domestic savings and investments and to attracting foreign
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loans. Under the new regime, foreign banks (and foreign ownership of domestic banks) were forbidden, and the private-sector banks were to be kept under
close governmental supervision. The instrument of this supervision was the
Bank of Mexico, created in 1925 to perform central bank functions. A complex

scheme of reserve requirements became the mechanism by which private
investment was to be channeled into high-priority sectors and by which savings

could be extracted for public-sector investments.
A strong private banking system capable and willing to make needed investments could not be resurrected overnight. Calles, CUrdenas, and their key
economic advisors acted to create a series of state development banks to do
what the private sector could not or would not: the Agrarian Credit Bank, the

Ejidal Bank, the Worker's and Industrial Development Bank, the Foreign
Commerce Bank, the Small Merchant's Bank, and, most importantly, Nacional

Financiera (NAFIN). The postrevolutionary leaders had come to define a
strong, development-oriented banking system as a critical need, and state
intervention as legitimate when the private sector was unable or unwilling to
act. The particular kinds of public-sector banks needed were defined by more
specific historical factors: the sectors earmarked to lead growth, and the needs
and demands of the groups and classes that constituted the social foundations of
the postrevolutionary Mexican state.15
Slowly, responding to the ministrations of the state, the private banking
system began to grow, as well, in terms of assets and in terms of institutional

strength and sophistication. One key measure in the state's nurturance, important in reorienting lending towards longer-term funding for industry and away

from more speculative investments, was the authorization in 1932 and subsequent encouragement offinancieras, a kind of investment bank." In the lack
of an effective bond or stock market, the national bourgeoisie that has developed in Mexico has largely crystallized around the private banking system. It
has come to be characterized by a series of groups-a dozen or so major ones
and many smaller ones--each having a bank or bank complex at its center, the
savings from which are utilized for investments in affiliated manufacturing,
mining, and/or commercial enterprises.17
The importance of what was done in the financial sector in the 1920s and
1930s does not lie in the fact of the state's intervention; strong state participation in the banking sector is hardly unusual, particularly in developing countries. What is to be stressed is that the pattern set down in the banking sector was

one that would be repeated elsewhere, in manufacturing, and in mining:
primary reliance was placed on the private sector, but the state stood prepared to

do what the private sector was unable or unwilling to do. And when the state
would act in last resort in these other sectors, it would act primarily through the

instrumentality of the public-sector development banks.
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Mexico's economists conceived of a total network of economic institutions and

processes necessary to complete the structure they were creating, and if the
private sector could not supply these, it seemed the obligation of the state to do so,

in the interests of the private sector itself.t"

Under the Cardenas regime (1934-40), there were important state economic
interventions in nonbanking areas: the state became the major or sole owner in
the light and power industry, the railroads, and the petroleum industry. In each

of these cases, however, it was foreign private investment that was being

challenged by the state; the intervention was spurred either by serious
bottlenecks, that were being created by foreign reticence to make needed
investments (light and power, railroads), or challenges to the sovereignty of the

Mexican state (oil companies); and in each of the cases it would have been
difficult for private Mexican investors to solve the problems because of high
risks, large initial investments, and long-term horizons on profits.19 The much
stronger action that Cirdenas was able to take toward foreign investment than
Calles, and Cirdenas's distinctive exercise of political power on behalf of the
workers and peasants, should not be allowed to obscure the strong continuity
with regard to the state's role in the economy. Nothing is so important in
explaining this continuity as the continuity of personnel in key financial
positions: Luis Montes de Oca, for example, president of the Bank of Mexico
under Cardenas, had served as general comptroller and finance minister in the
cabinets of Calles's Maximato; and Cardenas's finance minister, Eduardo

Suurez, retained the same position in the subsequent administration of Avila
Camacho, as did Antonio Espinosa de los Monteros, director general of Nacional Financiera.20

Expansion of State Intervention, 1940-70
The decades of the 1920s and 1930s had been ones of political and economic
reconstruction in Mexico. The foundations were laid in those years for the surge
of industrialization that began in the 1940s, and that was to be sustained into the

1970s. The Great Depression, in decreasing the volume of world trade, had
provided some stimulation for domestic production of consumer goods in
Mexico, and World War II added to the insulation of the domestic market from
imports the possibility of exports to the United States. Guided by its orientation

toward primary reliance on the private sector, the Mexican state (or, more
properly, the "effective" state centered around the president, the Treasury, and

public financial institutions) acted to encourage the private sector to respond to
the possibilities created by these changes in the international political economy.
In 1947, the war-induced protection of local industries over, the government

implemented a scheme of tariffs and quotas to sustain the import substitution
industrialization into which circumstances had already maneuvered Mexico.
174
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The assistance of the government to the private sector took an array of forms:

financing for new businesses through its development banks, basic infrastructure facilities and services, and beneficial tax policies. Public-sector purchases

of goods and services provided important markets for some young firms. The
manner in which Cirdenas had reorganized the political institutions (especially
the PRI) permitted a considerable measure of control over the labor force
through cooptation of its leaders, though there was occasional resort to coercion
as well. And, in 1954, after two significant devaluations in less than a decade,
the state took steps to damp down inflation: the policy of stabilized develop-

ment (desarrollo estabilizador) had emerged-a defining characteristic of
Mexico's growth strategy into the 1970s.
The emerging national bourgeoisie responded quickly to international conditions and government stimuli (though transnational corporations did so too,
especially during the 1950s and 60s21). But the context of late, late industrialization threw up new problems that the private sector was unable to meet. In a
range of basic industries, the investments that were necessary to sustain the

pace of industrialization, and, eventually, to "deepen" it beyond the light
consumer industries of the "easy" stage of import substitution, were of such
magnitude, high risk, or long-term character that they would not have been
made had not the state stepped in. The public-sector banks were the principal
instrument for the state's intervention, and the most important of these was

Nacional Financiera (NAFIN).22
Founded in 1934 to perform a complex variety of functions, including the
development of a stock exchange and a capital market for public bonds, NAFIN
was reorganized in December 1940 to make the promotion of industrial devel-

opment its principal focus. NAFIN rapidly became the major institutional arm
of the state's entrepreneurial activities, the instrumentality by which the state's

potential power, in relation to a still-maturing national bourgeoisie, became
actualized.

NAFIN's influence in shaping the character of state entrepreneurial activities
is in large part due to the powerful, relatively autonomous position it has within

the government. It has maintained its own financial base through a steady
record of earnings (which it has tended to capitalize), through the sale of
certificates of participation in the bank's equity investments, and through
continuing access to foreign loans (the Ex-Im Bank, for example). The relative
autonomy of NAFIN from the tricky currents of Mexican politics is enhanced as

well by the close coordination of its activities with the powerful Finance
Ministry and the Bank of Mexico. Representatives from both institutions sit on

NAFIN's board of directors, and there is a strong tendency for technical
personnel to move among the three institutions, imbuing them with a common

outlook. Moreover, there tends to be more continuity of top officials within
these institutions than in other ministries and state agencies.
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The bulk of NAFIN's loans and investments have gone to public-sector
infrastructure projects in railroads, irrigation, electric power, telecommunications, and the like. If we pass over these to concentrate on NAFIN's industrial

promotions, it is only because such infrastructure investments are a more
common and less contentious sort of intervention by the state into the economy
of a developing country. NAFIN's financing of industry has been considerable,
steadily accounting since 1950 for between one-third and one-half of the
banking system's total financing of industry.23 By 1945, NAFIN held stock in
thirty-five corporations and was majority owner of five, and by 1961:
it was a creditor, investor or guarantor for 533 business enterprises of all kinds; it

held stocks in 60 industrial firms; and it was majority stockholder in 13 firms
producing steel, textiles, motion pictures, plywood, paper, fertilizers, electrical
energy, sugar, lumber and refrigerated meats.24

From the beginning, NAFIN's activities were legally circumscribed to keep
it from emerging as a direct threat to the private sector. In practice, particularly

in its equity investments, NAFIN has tended to confine its entrepreneurial
activities to cases in which the private sector was unable or unwilling to make
investments in areas seen as crucial for industrialization.25
Wartime shortages and the failure of the private sector to meet the resultant

needs led to NAFIN's initial investments in paper, cement, and steel.26 Its
involvement in the steel industry is particularly dramatic and indicative of the
more general pattern.27 By the late 1930s, Mexico was importing two-thirds of
the steel needed for domestic consumption. The onset of the war meant that
imported steel would no longer be available. A group of private bankers and
investors drew up a plan for a new steel mill, but soon found that the project was

well beyond their financial and technical resources. NAFIN intervened, borrowing $6 million from the Export-Import Bank. At first it tried to avoid
majority ownership of Altos Hornos, as the new firm came to be called, buying
the whole of the venture's first bond issue and a majority of the preferred stock,

but only a quarter of the common stock. The firm took longer to move into
production than anticipated, and further financing was needed, which the
private interests would not commit. By 1947 NAFIN was majority owner of the
firm.

Altos Hornos was only the beginning of NAFIN's-and the

government's-involvement in the steel industry. In 1961 NAFIN extended
credit to allow Altos Hornos to acquire the La Consolidada steel works, lest that
firm should fail. As the large private firm Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de
Monterrey (founded in 1893) felt the need to modernize its equipment, and as
private investors have been hesitant to supply the necessary financing to the
aging firm, NAFIN has increasingly filled the gap, by 1975 coming to hold
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one-third of its equity. Similar circumstances have led NAFIN to take on a
minority equity holding in Tubos de Acero, another privately initiated firm.
And with the Mexican demand for steel far outstripping the capacityof these
existing firms, NAFIN has become involved in the development of a new steel
mill, the Siderirgica Lazaro Cardenas-Las Truchas (SICARTSA), a venture of
such size and sophistication as to be well beyond the capability of the private
sector.

In some cases, the hesitation of the private sector to make important invest-

ments stemmed from considerations of political risk rather than simply from

financing or technical drawbacks. After the Alemin administration came into
office in 1946, feasibility studies done by U.S. consultants and the Bank of
Mexico (Gonzalo Robles's department of industrial investigations) showed the
construction of railway freight cars, then imported used from the United States,

to be a prime industry candidate for import substitution. Where other such
proposed projects found willing private investors, this one did not. The market
volume was certain enough, but there would be only one buyer, a state-owned

enterprise. Further, the railways had been operating at a loss and were slow to

pay bills. Forcing collection from a state enterprise would undoubtedly be
difficult. With funding provided through NAFIN, the state itself undertook the

creation of Constructora Nacional de Carros de Ferrocarril in 1952.28

Although NAFIN's success and profitability have made it a target for charges
that it has intruded into areas that should have been left to the private sector, its
entrepreneurial activities have greatly benefited the private sector, and its own

equity investments have been centered in those fields and in those projects in
which circumstances "placed the minimum effort required well beyond the
capacity of the private entrepreneurs and investors of a still newly developing

economy":
The larger capital outlays required, the more complex operations which rendered
new ventures technically more difficult to launch, and the higher risks deriving

from uncertainties of costs and production flows as well as from the greater
market imponderables (i.e., greater than those encountered in industrialization to

substitute for consumer goods imports)."2

The last-resort character of the interventions of the state into the Mexican

economy can be seen in the efforts of NAFIN (and other state institutions) to
promote and finance projects of critical importance to national industrialization
which were beyond the capabilities of the private sector, but this last-resort
character can be seen as well in the Mexican state's willingness to bail out
private-sector firms which were on the brink of failure. Although such failures

often involve incompetence, they must be seen against the background of the
difficulties faced by national entrepreneurs in meeting the demands of import
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substitution industrialization. The cases of Diesel Nacional (DINA) and the
Sociedad Mexicana de Credito Industrial (SOMEX), an industrial firm and a

banking firm, are two of the major instances of a number that could be
considered here.

The initiative for Diesel Nacional came originally from two private-sector
promoters, Bruno Pagliai and Luis Montes de Oca. Together, and on the basis
of studies done by themselves, Fiat and NAFIN, they proposed to manufacture
diesel trucks in Mexico using Fiat technology. When these private investors
were unable to raise the capital necessary for the venture, they sought publicsector assistance. NAFIN subscribed to 59.5 million pesos of stock; the private
investors put in 10.5 million; and Fiat was allotted 6 million as payment for its
cooperation and technology.30 Diesel Nacional (DINA), which started operations in 1954, fared poorly. The Fiat truck was ill-adapted to Mexican roads and
cargos, the firm was induced to buy expensive and unnecessary machinery from

Fiat, and complex problems of distribution were never adequately solved.
Efforts to improve sales and profits by domestically assembling automobiles

then popular in Mexico (Fiat 1100s and 1400s) proved insufficient. Even
without these problems, it is difficult to see how the firm could have succeeded

without protection from imported vehicles. By 1958 the firm was nearly
bankrupt and the private investors eager to withdraw. The Mexican state, acting

principally through NAFIN, bought out their shares and recapitalized the
venture. The Mexican state had become sole proprietor of a major firm in the
rapidly developing Mexican automobile industry.31 DINA itself has expanded,
most often following "last resort" lines. When FANASA, the Mexican-owned
manufacturer of the ill-faied Borgward automobile, went bankrupt, and none of
the other auto firms showed interest, DINA stepped in to utilize the firm's plant

and equipment. Making contracts with International Harvester (and more
recently with General Motors), it organized a subsidiary called Maquiladora
Automotriz Nacional to assemble pickup trucks; and, in joint venture with

North American Rockwell, DINA and NAFIN set up DINA-Rockwell to
manufacture heavy-duty truck and bus axles.
The case of SOMEX is similar. Founded in 1941 by Dr. Antonio Sacristin, a
Spanish immigrant, SOMEX rapidly became one of the most importantfinan-

cieras in Mexico. It promoted and financed industrial enterprises in such
disparate fields as automobile assembly and parts manufacture, household
appliances, and the canning and fishing industries. By 1962 SOMEX owned or
participated in more than forty enterprises, but was on the point of bankruptcy,
beset by problems of internal administration and an overlong portfolio of
unprofitable firms, Sacristain having been more venturesome than other private
entrepreneurs. The Mexican government could not allow the failure of such a
major private bank. A number of the enterprises it owned were in sectors that
had been marked as priorities for industrial growth; the resultant unemployment
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would have caused considerable hardship and would have generated substantial
pressures for curative government action; and the failure would have shattered
public confidence in the banking system, savings from which were crucial for
both public- and private-sector investments. The viability of the entire growth

strategy would have been threatened. In taking over SOMEX, the state acquired

not only a second major industrial development bank, but also holdings in (a
majority position in many) over forty firms.32
The Mexican state's acquisition of unprofitable private sugar mills at an
accelerating rate during the 1960s and 1970s would seem to present another
example of state sector intervention and expansion resulting from private-sector

failure, but this case is more complicated.33
To maintain the low rate of inflation required by the post-1954 policy of
desarrollo estabilizador, price controls were instituted on basic commodities.
In 1958 they were placed on sugar. Labor costs in the sugar industry were not so

strictly controlled, however, and during the next ten years, labor costs rose 75
percent. The expansion of land under cane cultivation and the adoption of more
efficient agricultural methods were somewhat limited by the ejidal character of

neighboring lands, which the government was committed (at least to some
degree) to protect. Faced with rising costs but unable to expand production or to

raise prices, the private mills began to go bankrupt. The state's first response

was to create a special state banking institution, the Financiera Nacional
Azucarera, to channel investment capital to the industry. When that proved
insufficient and the mills continued to lose money, the state, now often the
major creditor, stepped in and took them over. A series of efforts to restructure

the industry during the 1970s were to no avail. By 1969, eighteen mills
(accounting for 30.7 percent of national production) were under government
control; by 1975 that number had increased to thirty-one (50.5 percent of
national production).
The failures of the private-sector firms were the immediate cause of the state
acquisitions in the sugar industry, but those failures were themselves induced
by government policies generated by orientations institutionalized in other state

agencies aimed at solving other problems of the industrialization strategy,
particularly the problem of inflation. Sugar operations became so unattractive
that existing owners would not make needed new investments and no buyers
could be found for struggling firms. The state stepped in not merely to recover
the loans it had made, but also to maintain a major source of rural employment
and to boost sugar production, production needed so that domestic demand
could be met without upward pressure on prices and so that there would once
again be export sales.
We have thus far explored two reasons for direct state intervention: the
reticence of the private sector to make needed investments, and the failures of
already existing private-sector enterprises. But there are also cases in which
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private-sector investment was available and successful but in which the state
intervened nevertheless; they are cases in which the private investment was
foreign. Private foreign investment raises special considerations, but not ones
that completely deviate from the last-resort character of the interventions of the

Mexican state. Earlier we considered a number of state actions towards foreign
investors during the Cirdenas regime, arguing that these interventions tended to
be triggered by problems (bottlenecks, etc.) that were unlikely to be solved so

long as the firms involved remained in foreign hands. After World War II,
however, nationalization became a very uncommon response of the Mexican
government to foreign investment: "Mexicanization" became the preferred
strategy. In order to regulate and control the activities of transnational corpora-

tions and to protect and promote the growth of a Mexican national bourgeoisie,

foreign investors were first encouraged and then required to share majority
ownership (equity) with Mexican partners.34 It has often proved difficult to
locate willing and able Mexican private investors for a variety of reasons: the
high initial expense of the 51 percent equity, the weak capital market, and
differences between the foreign investors and potential Mexican investors with
regard to the reinvestment of earnings, etc. For a time, the government helped
subsidize Mexicanization through tax incentives and other concessions; but,
more recently, finding these measures to be too costly in terms of tax revenues
foregone, it has promoted Mexicanization by itself acting as an investor of last
resort, providing that portion of the Mexican investment which private Mexican
capital has been reluctant to put forward. In the mining industry, for example,

NAFIN has participated in the Mexicanization of Azufrera Panamericana,
Compafiia Minera Autlfin, and Anaconda's giant Cananea mine. In the agricultural machinery industry, one in which there had been considerable pressure to Mexicanize, some of the firms had put 51 percent of their shares in trust
while they searched for suitable Mexican partners. After several years, when no

private Mexican investors showed interest in John Deere, NAFIN purchased
the shares itself. In these cases, the "need" for state intervention arose not so
much from the financial and technical requisites of the industrialization strategy

as from the political requisites of the Mexicanization posture towards foreign
investment.

Acting primarily as an institution of last resort, the Mexican state has
founded banks, promoted and financed firms in new and critical areas, bailed
out bankrupt ventures, and participated in the Mexicanization of foreign-owned
corporations. The total extent of these interventions of the state into the
Mexican economy is considerable-in 1976 the secretary of national property's
Directory of State Enterprises listed 470 firms.35 In 1974 these state sector
enterprises accounted for about 10 percent of Mexico's gross domestic product
(GDP).
Two final points of some importance need to be made concerning the manner
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in which new orientations are taken on by the Mexican state. Through lastresort intervention, a large number of new enterprises have been added to the
Mexican state, but, to an increasing extent, the orientations of these state firms

have come to be informed by the very character of the economic activity in
which they are engaged, and have displaced last-resort considerations. Shortly
after it first began production, Altos Hornos, one of NAFIN's first major
projects, began to move towards more fully integrated operations-much in the
manner of other major steel companies, public and private, elsewhere in the
world. It has moved aggressively to promote ventures guaranteeing it raw
material supplies, to add firms that make efficient use of its by-products, and to

acquire competitors to consolidate its product liens. Today, Altos Hornos
stands at the center of a complex of thirty-eight firms. Another instance of the

same pattern: when Chrysler's Mexican subsidiary was compelled under Mexican law to divert majority ownership in its diesel engine manufacturing concern, Motores Perkins, the buyer was state-owned Diesel Nacional (DINA), the
other major producer of automotive diesel engines. Not waiting to see if any
private investors might be interested in the acquisition, DINA moved swiftly to
acquire its competitor. In these cases and in a number of others, state firms
acquired for last-resort reasons have themselves intervened in the economy for
quite different purposes, acting much in the manner of private firms in the same
line of business.

Finally, political factors have also been important in reshaping the orientations of state enterprises. Though they are difficult to document, there surely

are instances of acquisitions and expansions by state firms whose top officials
are seeking to enhance their power and prestige in political circles. Just as
surely, there are instances of the use of public office for personal profit, and
these, too, alter the state's orientations. Perhaps still more important are
personnel changes, particularly those that come at the sexennial change of
administration. A variety of factors, including continuities among lower-level
tecnicos, limit how dramatic the resultant change in orientation may be, but

some significant redirection has taken place. SOMEX, for example, went
through a period of retrenchment, consolidation, and reorganization after the

government bailed it out in 1962. This made possible SOMEX's post-1970
return to the more aggressive investment attitude it had evidenced while in
private hands, but the change was in part fostered by the top SOMEX appointments made under the more statist and interventionist Echeverria regime. A
more dramatic recent example is state expansion in the mining sector, initiated

principally through the Comisi6n de Fomento Minero (CFM), an agency
attached to the Ministry of National Patrimony. Created in 1958, this distinctively nationalist-oriented ministry was initially concerned with the Mexicanization of mining through private-sector investment in the foreign-owned companies which dominated the industry. The more statist orientation of the
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Echeverria administration enhanced the power of this ministry within the
government, however, and encouraged its tecnicos (many of them brought in
by the Echeverria administration) to have the state make mining investments
itself, generally through the CFM. In the five years from 1970 to 1975, the
state's share in mining investments doubled from 17.8 percent to 35 percent.36

Conclusion

Alexander Gerschenkron's approach to the role of the state in the process of
industrialization, while pointing in the proper direction, nevertheless (we
argued in the introduction), has a certain incompleteness when taken as description, and a deeper flaw because of its functionalist character, when taken

as explanation. Gerschenkron does pose the problem of the state in a serious
way; he does see that the state has an inherent role marked out for it and that this

role varies in relation to historical circumstance. And yet Gerschenkron has no
theory of the state (nor even a firm conception of the state). His approach can
grasp the role that the state must play if industrialization and growth are to
proceed, but, in its functionalism, his approach gives no account of either the
state's power or of its orientations to play the historical role that it has. These are
correctable faults. The sketch we have just provided of the economic interven-

tions of the Mexican state since the Revolution contains an implicit conception

of the state which we now aim to make explicit.

The question of state orientations
The taken-on/filled-in character of state orientations. Gerschenkron has no
answer to the question of political will: How do the orientations of the state
arise? He identifies tasks that only the state can perform, and (as if by magic)

produces a state that is oriented to and capable of fulfilling those tasks.
Speaking rather broadly, we can identify two sorts of strategies for explaining
why the state acts as it does. Exogenous explanations see the state as responding
merely to pressures applied on it externally by groups, classes, or class factions.

Group theory explanations are of this sort" and (notwithstanding considerable
differences) "instrumentalist" Marxist approaches tend to favor this exogenous strategy.38 Endogenous explanatory strategies, on the other hand, understand the state as having orientations of its own that guide its action from within.

"Structuralist" Marxist explanations are predominantly of this sort,39 as are
"bureaucratic politics" approaches40 (though these are theoretically much
more rudimentary and short-term in character). There can be no question of
choosing a priori between these two explanatory strategies, though one or the
other may be more important in particular cases. Externally applied pressures
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have been important in limiting and shaping the actions of the Mexican state,
particularly in recent years, but the burden of the argument in this paper is that

one must look to the Mexican state's own orientations to explain its economic
interventions since the Revolution. The insufficiency of the exogenous strategy
can be seen in trying to explain why the Mexican state originally took on the
orientation that it did with regard to economic growth. Beginning in the 1920s,
the Mexican state took on the task of developing a national bourgeoisie, and in
no way can the very frail national bourgeoisie of that time be seen as a pressure
group sufficiently powerful to orient the state's actions.
Neither the "bureaucratic politics" approach nor the structuralist-Marxist

approach can be relied upon for an understanding of how the state's own
orientations arise, however. The former merely takes these as given. The latter
views the state as acting in accord with an internal logic that arises from the need

for an institution to resolve the contradictions of capitalist production, particularly those that arise between the various factions of the capitalist class; but, like
Gerschenkron, the structuralist approach risks falling into the functionalist
error (the orientation is called forth simply by the need), and it has tended to be
excessively abstract and inattentive to the specific shape those contradictions
take in a particular society.41
This paper argues that the state has orientations of its own and suggests three
ways in which these orientations can be taken on or filled in. First, at those
historical moments when the state is constituted (more often reconstituted),

those elements that have seized the political initiative can set down the initial
orientations of the state by devising an array of institutions which embody their

ideological vision, by coalescing class alliances to form the social foundations
of the reconstituted state, and by formulating legitimations to transform their

might into right. In postrevolutionary Mexico it was the constitutionalists
(small businessmen, commercial farmers) from Sonora who used military
power to capture political control and reconstitute the state. The orientation
with which they imbued key state institutions (the Finance Ministry and the
banks associated with it) defined a growth strategy that placed primary reliance
on the private sector, but which held the state in readiness to intervene in last

resort in instances of private-sector incapability or unwillingness. These initial
orientations were crucial: the character of the Mexican state became set in ways

which delimited the direction of future state expansion and which gradually
constrained the possibility of anything but marginal changes in state orientations, unless the state were captured and reconstituted by a wholly different
element.

Secondly, over time, particular crises or problems arise which the state may
see as necessary to confront and solve (it may be more or less reluctant to see
any particular problem as its responsibility). The mere existence of a problem or
crisis, however, does not automatically cause the creation of a state institution
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to deal with it. Whether or not the state will respond will itself be shaped by
already existing orientations. Acting on the basis of orientations that have
already been taken on and institutionalized within the state apparatus, new
problems thrust upon the state will be defined in certain ways and institutional
mechanisms created or adapted to deal with them. In Mexico, an initial set of
last-resort orientations towards problems of savings and investment were institutionalized in a complex of state-sector financial institutions. In the face of
private-sector difficulties in certain key sectors, the state intervened, creating
enterprises in fields as diverse as steel and fertilizers, and taking over enterprises engaged in dozens of other endeavors.

NAFIN, to take one interesting example, was originally created out of the
continuing concern of the state to develop an adequate financial system; it was
particularly charged with the development of a stock and bond market. But as
the international economy changed (due to the Great Depression and World
War II) and import substitution industrialization became both a necessity and an

opportunity, NAFIN was reorganized to serve as an industrial development
bank. The orientation that came to guide the bank during the 1940s has more or

less continued to inform its activities, though there have been some changes (a
greater concern with regional development and with small businesses, for

example). As the state has acquired or created various industrial enterprisesAtenquique, DINA, etc.-in response to problems of private-sector incapability or failure, new organisms have been added to the state, with their own
distinctive tasks and orientations, and these institutionally based orientations
have thus been added to the state's repertoire. Altos Hornos and SOMEX were
acquired by the state acting out of last-resort considerations, but these state
enterprises themselves, acting in response to their own problems, needs, and
guiding orientations have acquired or initiated other ventures in ways that move
beyond last-resort considerations strictly defined, often paralleling the orienta-

tions of private-sector firms in the same industry. Hence, Altos Homos's
expansion for vertical integration, or DINA's acquisition of Motores Perkins.
In other instances, political ambitions on the part of directors of state enterprises

have generated expansions or acquisitions by these firms in situations that
cannot be seen to be limited to last-resort considerations.

Changes in government personnel are a third way in which different orientations can be filled in or taken on by the state. The most important mechanism for

such changes in postrevolutionary Mexico has been the sexennial change in
administration, and the substantial turnover in key officials each new president

institutes. Despite the enduring role of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, new presidents have altered the orientations of the state, often by adding

new tasks to its repertoire: the Lopez Mateos administration brought with it a
concern for strong state action to restimulate import substitution; Echeverria
brought a decidedly more statist orientation than his predecessors. Changes in
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presidential administration, however, are not likely to provide channels for a
group representing a different social-class faction to "capture" the state and
alter, to any dramatic extent, the state's orientations. Although there is considerable debate over whether Chrdenas' s mobilization of peasants and labor in the
1930s, and his replacement by Avila Camacho's more conservative adminis-

tration in 1940, constitute such changes, the sedimentation of state institutions

in the post-1940 period has made changes in orientations increasingly difficult,

except on the margins. And, in the ministries and agencies concerned with
economic growth in Mexico, there has been an unusual continuity of outlook,
the product of continuity of personnel, constraints set by institutionalized
orientations the state had already taken on, and of enduring features of the
domestic and international environment.

The definition ofproblems. Understanding the orientations of the state helps
us to move beyond the incompleteness of Gerschenkron's account in its de-

scriptive character; it allows us to understand how such central terms as
"problem" are defined historically. Although many of Mexico's problems had
a certain "objective" character which would make them recognizable in other

developing countries (the problem of rapid capital accumulation, balance-of-

payment deficits, etc.), we also saw how such problems were historically
defined by the particular political dynamics and ideological currents in Mexico.
The political decision to accept a stabilization program and orthodox monetary
policy in the early 1950s, for example, led to another political decision to
control sugar prices. Coupled with a political decision to let wages rise in the
industry, a situation was created where the private sector became unwilling to
invest in sugar production. This created political problems (unemployment in
sugar regions, popular-sector unrest if the prices of basic commodities were not
kept low) and an economic problem (loss of export revenue). The state responded by taking over the sugar mills. Another example: it was the political

definition of foreign investment as a problem and of Mexicanization as a
solution that induced "last-resort" state purchases of equity in TNC subsidiaries.

The question of state power State intervention into the economy of late
dependent industrialization does not depend simply on prerequisites needing to
be filled or problems that would be left unsolved if left to private-sector
institutional arrangements. The state must have thepower to intervene and a full
explanation must take power as a variable, not a given. We have argued that the
Mexican state had the power to act as a banker and entrepreneur because of the
way in which strong political institutions were created after the Revolution and
because of the weak and disorganized nature of the private sector at this time.

Further, certain factors stemming from Mexico's place in the international
political economy created possibilities for state action. The Great Depression
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and World War II opened the possibility for pursuing import substitution
industrialization, and the threat of conflict in Europe somewhat tempered U.S.
reaction to the 1938 oil nationalizations. Other factors, however, severely
limited the power of the state: the needs of the Obreg6n and Calles governments

for U.S. diplomatic recognition in order to refinance the huge external debt not

only would have made difficult a development strategy that challenged private
capital, but actually did force these regimes to stop their moves against U.S. oil

companies.
These few remarks are only meant to be suggestive. This paper has been
principally concerned with the problem of orientations, and we are far from
presenting a full explanation of the growth, maintenance, and limits of the
power of the Mexican state. We might close, however, by touching on very
current matters which any such explanation would have to take into consideration-two factors placing increasingly stiff limits on the power of the Mexican
state to intervene in the economy.

One is increasing resistance from the very national bourgeoisie the state
helped to create. Sometimes this resistance has taken dramatic, public form,
such as the determined opposition that President Echeverria faced from the
Monterrey business groups, particularly the flight of capital that occurred in the

last years of his regime. But there are other, less visible, but surely important
ways that the activities of the national bourgeoisie-which now constitutes a
crucial part of the social foundations of the state-limit state action. Foremost,
perhaps, is the systematic connection between state spending and private-sector
investment. The state finances many of its activities through a complex scheme

of reserve requirements in the banking system. Increased state expenditures
lead to high interest rates and a tightening of credit for private investment, but

this only increases the need for state expenditures as the state is increasingly
compelled to act in last resort in the face of declining private-sector investment.

The state-business-labor pact (Alianza para la Producci6n) organized by President L6pez Portillo when he took office in December 1976 was aimed at solving
this dilemma, one of its key terms being an agreement by the state to cut
spending in return for increased private-sector investments. The problem persists, however. Government officials are showing impatience with what they
consider private-sector heel dragging and urging more public-sector investment.

Mexico's substantial foreign debt constitutes a second obstacle to state
intervention in the economy.42 Partly to avoid dependence on the private sector

while making investments needed to overcome the potential exhaustion of the
"easy stage" of import substitution industrialization, the Mexican state has
engaged substantial foreign debts to finance its activities. The increased willingness of transnational banks to lend to certain lesser-developed countries like

Mexico in the late 1960s and early 1970s helped make possible the expansion of
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state economic activities engineered by the Echeverria regime. Inflation and a
fast-growing debt service constituted new problems, however. Under pressure
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and private
transnational banks, Mexico was forced to devalue twice in the last months of

1976 and had to make promises to restrain governmental expenditures. The
internal pressures of the national bourgeoisie compounded by the external
pressures set by foreign indebtedness have created a contradiction: the ability of
the state to continue to act as an institution of last resort, while at the same time

following a policy of primary reliance on the private sector, seems to be
severely threatened at this point in Mexican history.

NOTES

*The theoretical arguments in this paper benefited greatly from ongoing collaborative work w

Dr. Morris J. Blachman. The skillful research assistance of Bonnie Sharpe was importa

collecting the case data used for this paper. Funding from the following foundations made p
the larger research project of which this paper is a part: the Tinker Foundation, the Social S
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